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Abstract
We analyze an economy populated by a sequence of generations who decide over their
consumption and investment in human capital of their immediate descendants. The
objective of the paper is twofold: ﬁrstly, to identify the impact of strategic interac-
tions between consecutive generations on the time path of human capital accumula-
tion. To this end, we characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in such an
economy and derive the suﬃcient conditions for its existence and uniqueness. We
then benchmark our results against an optimal but time-inconsistent policy which
abstracts from strategic interactions between generations. We prove analytically
that human capital accumulation is unambiguously lower in the “strategic” case
than in the optimal, “non-strategic” case.
The second objective of the current paper is to work out a functional parametriza-
tion of the model, suitable for obtaining clear-cut results on the monotonicity of the
(unique) Markov perfect equilibrium policy and the optimal policy. We then carry
out a sensitivity analysis under this parametrization, thereby assessing quantita-
tively the magnitude of discrepancies between human capital accumulation paths
whether strategic interactions between consecutive generations are taken into ac-
count or not.
Keywords: human capital, intergenerational interactions, Markov perfect equi-
librium, stochastic transition, constructive approach
JEL codes: C73, I20, J22
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Non-technical summary
Non-technical summary
Human capital is nowadays widely acknowledged to be one of the most important
factors determining the diﬀerences in wealth across nations as well as their growth
potential. The variable is thus present in a wide range of micro- and macroeconomic
theories, including those taking an explicitly intergenerational planning perspective.
In such theories, various forms of altruism are proposed to deal with the empirically
grounded intergenerational correlations and linkages in wealth, human capital, social
status, and occupation choice. In particular, strategic interactions across generations
should be especially apparent in relation to schooling.
If one assumes that within each generation, people derive their utility from –
among other things – the utility of their children, then there logically follows an
inﬁnite-horizon planning problem: the parents care for children who care for grand-
children who care for great-grandchildren, etc. A markedly diﬀerent situation might
however be encountered if the parents care for their children’s consumption directly:
it is then crucial if there is a way for all consecutive generations to credibly commit
to their future choices. If not, then there must exist some ﬁnite cut-oﬀ point be-
yond which the consumption of further generations does not matter for the original
generation’s utility. And it is precisely the inclusion of such a ﬁnite cut-oﬀ which
takes us from the standard dynastic optimization frameworks to models where the
planning problem becomes strategic. As the natural ﬁrst step in such a procedure,
this article considers strategic interactions between two consecutive generations.
From the human capital theory perspective, the investigations of the current arti-
cle are based on the presumption that dynamic paths of human capital accumulation
might markedly diﬀer whether there are strategic interactions across generations in-
volved or not (or equivalently, whether there is full or only partial commitment to
future generations’ choices). Basic economic intuition tells us that if strategic as-
pects come into play, or if commitment is only partial, the willingness to invest in
future generations’ human capital should be lower. This paper inspects under which
conditions the omission of strategic interactions can be a serious shortcoming of the
non-strategic approaches and presents one way to alleviate it.
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From the technical perspective, the point of departure of the current article
is the following. The original generation (i.e. the parents) would like to choose
their consumption level and the level of investment in human capital of their chil-
dren optimally which requires considering the possible options the children will face
in the subsequent period – when they will themselves become independent utility
maximizers. The parents would therefore like to embed their children’s optimiza-
tion problems in their own and thus become “leaders” of such an intergenerational
strategic game. Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be carried out directly: since
the children’s optimization problem embeds the optimization problem of their own
children, and so forth ad inﬁnitum, we end up with an inﬁnite series of embedded
strategic games. The problem with applying usual ﬁxed-point arguments here is
that the strategic component of the embedded games creates a “vicious circle” of
strategy space which has obstructed the development of economic theories in this
vein for many years. This issue has been resolved only recently, thanks to the crucial
technical developments of Amir (1996a,c) and Nowak (2006). The current article
applies these developments to the case of intergenerational interactions in human
capital accumulation.
Given this background, the contribution of the current paper to the literature is
twofold. First, we identify the impact of strategic interactions between consecutive
generations on the human capital accumulation path as well as its steady state in
an economy populated by a sequence of generations allowed to decide over their
consumption levels as well as over the levels of investment in human capital of their
immediate descendants. We are able to obtain clear-cut results here by computing
the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) human capital investment policy at the ag-
gregated level and benchmarking the time-consistent MPE result against the optimal
but time-inconsistent policy which neglects strategic interactions across generations.
In this regard, we provide an analytical proof that, other things equal, human capital
accumulation is unambiguously smaller in the strategic model than in the dynastic
model. Secondly, we work out a functional parametrization of the model, suitable
for obtaining clear-cut results on the monotonicity of the (unique) Markov perfect
equilibrium policy and the optimal policy. We then carry out a sensitivity analysis
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under this parametrization, thereby assessing quantitatively the magnitude of dis-
crepancies between human capital accumulation paths whether strategic interactions
between consecutive generations are taken into account or not.
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1
1 Introduction
Human capital is nowadays widely acknowledged to be one of the most important
factors determining the diﬀerences in wealth across nations as well as their growth
potential. The variable is thus present in a wide range of micro- and macroeconomic
theories, including those taking an explicitly intergenerational planning perspective.
In such theories, various forms of altruism (cf. Abel and Warshawsky, 1987; Arrondel
and Masson, 2006; Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimueller, 2006) are proposed to deal
with the empirically grounded intergenerational correlations and linkages in wealth,
human capital, social status, and occupation choice. In particular, strategic inter-
actions across generations should be especially apparent in relation to schooling: on
the one hand, a substantial fraction of investment in accumulating human capital of
an individual is made by her parents, while on the other hand, the parents cannot
fully anticipate what use will be eventually made of these personal assets (Becker
and Tomes, 1986; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Lochner, 2008; Loury, 1981; Orazem
and Tesfatsion, 1997).1
If one assumes that within each generation, people derive their utility from –
among other things – the utility of their children, then there logically follows an
inﬁnite-horizon planning problem: the parents care for children who care for grand-
children who care for great-grandchildren, etc. A markedly diﬀerent situation might
however be encountered if the parents care for their children’s consumption directly.
It is then crucial if there is a way for all consecutive generations to credibly commit
to their future choices. If not, we are led to frameworks where the optimization
problem becomes strategic. The impact of such strategic interactions is not clear a
priori. On the one hand, their presence and the resulting lack of commitment may
lower each generations’ investment. But on the other hand, as noted by Bernheim
and Ray (1987), higher investment today is needed to obtain the same result in
1The classic works within the human capital accumulation literature, such as Mincer (1958)
or Ben-Porath (1967), focus primarily on the other component of investment in education which
is individuals’ own purposeful educational spending motivated by the expected increases in their
future earnings. The Ben-Porath’s model speciﬁcation is however already ﬂexible enough to allow
for intergenerational transmission of human capital as well.
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terms of tommorow’s consumption and utility.
The contribution of the current paper to the literature is twofold. First, we
identify the impact of strategic interactions between consecutive generations on the
human capital accumulation path as well as its steady state in an economy populated
by a sequence of generations allowed to decide over their consumption levels as well
as over the levels of investment in human capital of their immediate descendants. We
are able to obtain clear-cut results here by computing the Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) human capital investment policy at the aggregated level and benchmarking
the time-consistent MPE result against the optimal but time-inconsistent policy
which neglects strategic interactions across generations.2 Second, we work out a
functional parametrization of the model, suitable for obtaining clear-cut results on
the monotonicity of the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium policy and the optimal
policy. We then carry out a sensitivity analysis under this parametrization, thereby
assessing quantitatively the magnitude of discrepancies between human capital ac-
cumulation paths whether strategic interactions between consecutive generations are
taken into account or not.
As far as the economic subject of this paper is concerned, our results include an
analytical proof that, other things equal, the equilibrium human capital accumu-
lation policy is unambiguously (pointwise) smaller in the strategic model than the
optimal policy in a dynastic model. To provide this result with a quantitative edge,
we also run a series of numerical exercises quantifying how large the diﬀerences be-
tween the optimal human capital accumulation decisions could be whether strategic
interactions are present or not.3 Hence this paper not only puts in question the
estimates obtained from models neglecting such intergenerational interactions, but
2In Section 6.3, we also compare these two setups to a model similarly frequently used in
the literature, i.e. the one of joy-of-giving altruism (used by, among numerous others, Abel and
Warshawsky (1987); Artige, Camacho, and de la Croix (2004); Bruhin and Winkelmann (2009)).
3Additionally, we also show numerically that the joy-of-giving altruism model diﬀers markedly
from the strategic and the dynastic model, insofar the implied optimal decisions cannot be unam-
biguously compared against each other: for most parameter values, joy-of-giving altruism implies
more human capital investment than the strategic model, but for a range of speciﬁc parametric
choices, this relationship is reversed.
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can also be viewed as a methodological contribution to the discussion on intergener-
ational transfers, distribution of wealth, and the corresponding public policy in the
class of OLG models initiated by Barro (1974) and continued in a series of papers by
Laitner (see Laitner (1979, 2002) and references therein), Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers (1985), and – speciﬁcally in the context of human capital accumulation –
by Drazen (1978).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the re-
lated literature, both from the substantive, and the methodological–technical angle.
In Section 3 we lay out our basic model with strategic interactions and present the
principal theoretical results. In Section 4 we compare this model with a benchmark
model where no strategic interactions are allowed. Section 5 provides an illustrative
numerical example for our calculations of the preceding chapters. Section 6 discusses
the role of strategic interactions in shaping human capital investment decisions. Sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The topic of intergenerational commitment and strategic interactions has been widely
studied in the economic literature, both of normative and of positive nature. The
former group of articles includes, among others, works by Dasgupta (1974b), Das-
gupta (1974a) and Lane and Mitra (1981). According to Dasgupta (1974b), the
Nash equilibrium is a concept corresponding to the universalizability criterion of
distributive justice discussed by Rawls, while Lane and Mitra (1981) study Pareto
(in)eﬃciency of a Nash equilibrium in a class of games of intergenerational altru-
ism. The“positive”literature on strategic interactions between generations includes
papers by Leininger (1986), Bernheim and Ray (1987), Bernheim and Ray (1989),
Amir (1996c) and Nowak (2006). In deterministic as well as stochastic settings,
these authors prove existence of a (Markov, Lipschitz continuous) perfect equilib-
rium in this class of games. Finally, the literature on hyperbolic discounting oﬀers
one more motivation for studying economic settings where consecutive generations
(or current and future selves) play strategically in consumption decisions (see Phelps
11Introduction
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and Pollak (1968), Peleg and Yaari (1973) or more recently Laibson (1997), Bern-
heim, Ray, and Yeltekin (1999) and Krusell and Smith (2003)). Based on these
three considerations – altruistic preferences, hyperbolic discounting, and distribu-
tive justice – in our paper we let each generations’ utilities be deﬁned over their
own and the successive generation’s consumption, leading to strategic interactions
and necessitating an application of the (Markov perfect) Nash equilibrium concept
rather than just an optimal planning solution.
The commitment problem in intergenerational setups is also closely related to
the issue of time (in)consistency of optimal plans which has been studied in detail by
economists ever since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977). Although Kydland
and Prescott’s pathbreaking contributions focused primarily on strategic interactions
between the private economy and the government while the current paper deals with
strategic interactions between private agents only, the conceptual and numerical
problems are the same for both approaches.
From the human capital theory perspective, the investigations of the current
article are based on the presumption that dynamic paths of human capital ac-
cumulation might markedly diﬀer whether there are strategic interactions across
generations involved or not (or equivalently, whether there is full or only partial
commitment to future generations’ choices). Basic economic intuition tells us that
if strategic aspects come into play, or if commitment is only partial, the willingness
to invest in future generations’ human capital should be lower. The neglect of in-
tergenerational interactions, habitually done in the literature, should thus lead to a
(potentially large) overestimation of the strength of the postulated intergenerational
human capital transmission mechanisms. This paper inspects and measures under
which conditions this can be a serious shortcoming of the non-strategic approaches
and presents one way to alleviate it.
From the technical perspective, the point of departure of the current article
is the following. The original generation (i.e. the parents) would like to choose
their consumption level and the level of investment in human capital of their chil-
dren optimally which requires considering the possible options the children will face
in the subsequent period – when they will themselves become independent utility
12Related literature
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dren optimally which requires considering the possible options the children will face
in the subsequent period – when they will themselves become independent utility
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maximizers. The parents would therefore like to embed their children’s optimiza-
tion problems in their own and thus become “leaders” of such an intergenerational
strategic game. Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be carried out directly: since
the children’s optimization problem embeds the optimization problem of their own
children, and so forth ad inﬁnitum, we end up with an inﬁnite series of embedded
strategic games. The problem with applying usual ﬁxed-point arguments here is
that the strategic component of the embedded games creates a “vicious circle” of
strategy space which has obstructed the development of economic theories in this
vein for many years (see e.g. Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968)). The
(Markov perfect) equilibrium existence results for a deterministic incarnation of the
game has been obtained by Bernheim and Ray (1983) and Leininger (1986), and for
the stochastic setting – thanks to Amir (1996a,c) and Nowak (2006). These cru-
cial technical developments are however based on topological arguments, existential
rather than constructive in nature, and thus without additional results regarding
uniqueness of the analyzed equilibrium, their usefulness in applied work is uncer-
tain.
In this regard, we should also mention the methods for showing equilibrium
existence in the class of dynamic games proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1980)
and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) – the latter frequently abbreviated as APS.
In this line of research, existence results come almost for free, but unfortunately
almost no equilibrium characterization is available, not to mention uniqueness of
the analyzed equilibria or computational possibilities4.
There is one more line of theoretical contributions closely related to our paper.
Klein, Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull in a series of papers on time-consistent taxa-
tion propose an intuitive numerical technique for equilibrium computation by value
function iteration. Speciﬁcally, Klein and R´ ıos-Rull (2003) and Klein, Vincenzo,
4Consider for example a study of a Markovian equilibrium set for a distorted competitive econ-
omy a la Coleman (1991). If you use APS, what you can conclude existence of values that can be
supported by a measurable selection from the Markovian equilibrium correspondence. If you use
the direct approach a la Mirman, Morand, and Reﬀett (2008), you can provide e.g. existence of a
unique smooth Markov equilibrium or a complete lattice of locally Lipschitz Markovian equilibria.
13
maximizers. The parents would therefore like to embed their children’s optimiza-
tion problems in their own and thus become “leaders” of such an intergenerational
strategic game. Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be carried out directly: since
the children’s optimization problem embeds the optimization problem of their own
children, and so forth ad inﬁnitum, we end up with an inﬁnite series of embedded
strategic games. The problem with applying usual ﬁxed-point arguments here is
that the strategic component of the embedded games creates a “vicious circle” of
strategy space which has obstructed the development of economic theories in this
vein for many years (see e.g. Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968)). The
(Markov perfect) equilibrium existence results for a deterministic incarnation of the
game has been obtained by Bernheim and Ray (1983) and Leininger (1986), and for
the stochastic setting – thanks to Amir (1996a,c) and Nowak (2006). These cru-
cial technical developments are however based on topological arguments, existential
rather than constructive in nature, and thus without additional results regarding
uniqueness of the analyzed equilibrium, their usefulness in applied work is uncer-
tain.
In this regard, we should also mention the methods for showing equilibrium
existence in the class of dynamic games proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1980)
and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) – the latter frequently abbreviated as APS.
In this line of research, existence results come almost for free, but unfortunately
almost no equilibrium characterization is available, not to mention uniqueness of
the analyzed equilibria or computational possibilities4.
There is one more line of theoretical contributions closely related to our paper.
Klein, Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull in a series of papers on time-consistent taxa-
tion propose an intuitive numerical technique for equilibrium computation by value
function iteration. Speciﬁcally, Klein and R´ ıos-Rull (2003) and Klein, Vincenzo,
4Consider for example a study of a Markovian equilibrium set for a distorted competitive econ-
omy a la Coleman (1991). If you use APS, what you can conclude existence of values that can be
supported by a measurable selection from the Markovian equilibrium correspondence. If you use
the direct approach a la Mirman, Morand, and Reﬀett (2008), you can provide e.g. existence of a
unique smooth Markov equilibrium or a complete lattice of locally Lipschitz Markovian equilibria.
13Related literature
WORKING PAPER No. 71 1
2
maximizers. The parents would therefore like to embed their children’s optimiza-
tion problems in their own and thus become “leaders” of such an intergenerational
strategic game. Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be carried out directly: since
the children’s optimization problem embeds the optimization problem of their own
children, and so forth ad inﬁnitum, we end up with an inﬁnite series of embedded
strategic games. The problem with applying usual ﬁxed-point arguments here is
that the strategic component of the embedded games creates a “vicious circle” of
strategy space which has obstructed the development of economic theories in this
vein for many years (see e.g. Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968)). The
(Markov perfect) equilibrium existence results for a deterministic incarnation of the
game has been obtained by Bernheim and Ray (1983) and Leininger (1986), and for
the stochastic setting – thanks to Amir (1996a,c) and Nowak (2006). These cru-
cial technical developments are however based on topological arguments, existential
rather than constructive in nature, and thus without additional results regarding
uniqueness of the analyzed equilibrium, their usefulness in applied work is uncer-
tain.
In this regard, we should also mention the methods for showing equilibrium
existence in the class of dynamic games proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1980)
and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) – the latter frequently abbreviated as APS.
In this line of research, existence results come almost for free, but unfortunately
almost no equilibrium characterization is available, not to mention uniqueness of
the analyzed equilibria or computational possibilities4.
There is one more line of theoretical contributions closely related to our paper.
Klein, Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull in a series of papers on time-consistent taxa-
tion propose an intuitive numerical technique for equilibrium computation by value
function iteration. Speciﬁcally, Klein and R´ ıos-Rull (2003) and Klein, Vincenzo,
4Consider for example a study of a Markovian equilibrium set for a distorted competitive econ-
omy a la Coleman (1991). If you use APS, what you can conclude existence of values that can be
supported by a measurable selection from the Markovian equilibrium correspondence. If you use
the direct approach a la Mirman, Morand, and Reﬀett (2008), you can provide e.g. existence of a
unique smooth Markov equilibrium or a complete lattice of locally Lipschitz Markovian equilibria.
13
and R´ ıos-Rull (2005) analyze5 the Markov perfect equilibrium in a growth model
without (tax policy) commitment using techniques essentially based on numerical
iteration of the value function under a linear-quadratic approximation. There are,
however, two problems with applications of this approach to the our case. Firstly,
no controlled accuracy or error bounds are provided for these approximations. Sec-
ondly and more importantly, their method is based on diﬀerentiability of the policy
function and connected strict concavity and twice diﬀerentiability of the (inﬁnite
horizon) value function which, perhaps apart from a few cases of speciﬁc functional
forms representing preferences and technology, is very problematic to be shown (see
e.g. the assumptions in Santos (1994), Montrucchio (1998) necessary for policy func-
tion diﬀerentiability). And although recently Klein, Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2008)
managed to solve the ﬁrst mentioned problem by proposing a characterization of the
time-consistent policy in terms of ﬁrst order conditions (the so-called Generalized
Euler Equation), the second argument, to our best knowledge, remains unsolved.
Hence, as for our human capital bequest economy, there are no results available
yet on the uniqueness or diﬀerentiability of the Markov perfect equilibrium (see
Kohlberg (1976) and Amir (1996c) for discussion), we cannot apply the methods
proposed by Klein, Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull for a constructive study.
Given the drawbacks of all discussed methods, the only suitable technical frame-
work for the study of our human capital bequest economy with strategic interactions
is – to our best knowledge – the one oﬀered by Balbus, Reﬀett, and Wo´ zny (2008).
The reason is that these authors not only obtain the equilibrium uniqueness result
(within an appropriate set of Lipschitz continuous policies) but also put forward a
constructive numerical algorithm for computing the Markov perfect equilibrium in
games of intergenerational altruism, based on iterating the best response map. The
algorithm guarantees uniform convergence, thanks to which we are able to solve the
technical problem of computing error bounds. The technique due to Balbus, Reﬀett,
and Wo´ zny (2008) comes, however, at a cost as well. Speciﬁcally it is restrictive in
5Klein, Vincenzo, and R´ ıos-Rull (2005) analyze a two country model and hence not only need
to solve a taxation commitment problem but also ﬁnd a within-period Nash equilibrium of a two
country game.
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terms of requiring a speciﬁc form of stochastic transition of the state variable – here,
the human capital stock. Two main features of this transition are the following: (i)
it is deﬁned in terms of distributions over the next period state space parameterized
by the a current period investment and current state and (ii) it“separates”decisions
from distributions by requiring a certain functional form of the mixing functions.
Such stochastic transition has already been widely used by Amir (1997) in optimal
growth theory; by Amir, Nowak and coauthors6 in the directly related context of
dynamic games; as well as (at somehow more general level) by Magill and Quinzii
(2009) in the general equilibrium framework.
On the one hand our assumption on the shape of the stochastic transition func-
tion is quite general but critical for the results on uniqueness and construction of the
equilibrium. On the other hand, it also has two main drawbacks. First, it requires
a certain level of“mixing”(see assumption 2 for the details), and speciﬁcally cannot
be reduced to the deterministic case. The second drawback is that there are no
known ways yet to prove existence of appropriate price systems decentralizing ﬁrms’
allocations in a general equilibrium context under stochastic technologies expressed
by such probability distributions.
Recently Magill and Quinzii (2009) have proposed, however, a way to decentralize
the optimal allocation in a (two-period) economy with technology being a probability
distribution (over a ﬁnite number of states), rather than an Arrow-Debreu“state of
nature” production function. By generalizing the Magill and Quinzii approach, one
could thus obtain a counterpart of the ﬁrst welfare theorem for our model, and con-
sequently derive its decentralization both in the case of the optimal,“non-strategic”
human capital allocation, and of the “strategic” Markov perfect equilibrium alloca-
tion (together with the result due to Lane and Leininger (1986), generalized to a
stochastic setting). Although such a characterization could be obtained in principle,
there are no known ways to show existence of appropriate (recursive and integrable)
prices of Arrow securities in an economy with an inﬁnite horizon, uncountable num-
ber of states, and a stochastic production technology. Hence, it is not the strategic
interactions that constitute the problem for a decentralization in our setup, but the
6See Amir (2002), Nowak (2007) and references therein.
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stochastic formulation of technology and the uncountable set of states. Finally, let
us mention that this should not be considered as a serious drawback of our results,
since by the mentioned counterpart of the ﬁrst welfare theorem, both of our analyzed
allocations can actually appear on real markets.
The crucial contributions of this paper are therefore purely theoretical. The lack
of immediate empirical applications of our theory comes from the fact that the model
developed herein, though based on sound microeconomic foundations, is admittedly
simpliﬁed. We are therefore convinced that it would be a stark exaggeration to
calibrate it in its current form in order to draw quantitative implications aimed at
discriminating between competing theories of human capital accumulation based on
empirical evidence. Another reason for this limitation are mentioned problems of
a general equilibrium decentralization of both the strategic and the dynastic op-
timization frameworks. Being aware of these theoretical and technical diﬃculties,
our model should nevertheless be considered as an important ﬁrst step: it is the
ﬁrst model of human capital accumulation which integrates and rigorously calcu-




Our model economy is populated by an inﬁnite sequence of generations whose sizes
are equal and normalized to unity. Each generation t = 0,1,2,... is characterized
by the common utility function U, taking values U(ct,ct+1), where ct is the total
consumption of generation t. We assume U to be time-separable7 and take the form:
U(ct,ct+1) = u(ct) + v(ct+1). The consumption set is Y = [0, ¯ Y ] where ¯ Y ∈ R+.
7We analyze the case of time-separable utility functions only because the monotone methods
used in Theorem 2 rely on this assumption heavily and because this assumption has been exten-
sively used in literature. The case of non-time separable utility functions could also be analyzed
nonetheless. This would require the use of results on mixed monotone operators. See Guo, Cho,
and Zhu (2004) and the applications in Balbus, Reﬀett, and Wo´ zny (2008).
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The unique consumption good is produced using technology f which requires two
kinds of inputs: (i) time devoted to work ˆ lt, and (ii) human capital ht. The set
H = [0, ¯ H], where ¯ H ∈ R+, represents all possible levels of human capital. We
neglect all physical capital accumulation in our basic model. Human capital, on the
other hand, is accumulated using technology ˜ g taking as inputs: (i) the current level
of human capital ht, and (ii) time devoted to human capital accumulation 1 − ˆ lt.
Technically, our assumptions on the considered economy are the following:
Assumption 1 Let:
• u,v : Y → R be increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisfying limc→0 u(c) =
limc→0 v(c) = ∞; (∀c ∈ Y,c > 0) u(c) < ∞ and (∀c ∈ Y,c > 0) v(c) < ∞.
Moreover, let u and v be strictly concave and such that u(0) = v(0) = 0,
• f : H×[0,1] → Y be strictly concave with respect to the second argument, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable with ﬁnite partial derivatives, and satisfying (∀ˆ l ∈
[0,1]) f(0,ˆ l) = 0, (∀h ∈ H) limˆ l→0 f
2(h,ˆ l) = ∞. Furthermore, assume that
(∀h ∈ (0, ¯ H])f(h,·) and (∀ˆ l ∈ (0,1])f(·,ˆ l) are strictly increasing functions.
Within each generation, the household chooses its consumption level ct to max-
imize utility U, that is:
max
ct
u(ct) + v(ct+1). (3.1)
The neglect of physical capital accumulation requires assuming full depreciation as
well. All output is thus immediately consumed: ct = f(ht,ˆ lt), where ˆ lt ∈ [0,1].
Human capital, on the other hand, is accumulated according to the equation:
ht+1 = ˜ g(ht,1 − ˆ lt), where ˜ g : H × [0,1] is a continuous, strictly positive function.
Substituting the relations speciﬁed above into (3.1) and ignoring time subscripts we
obtain the following household maximization problem:
max
ˆ l∈[0,1]
u(f(h,ˆ l)) + v(f(˜ g(h,1 − ˆ l),˜ l)). (3.2)
The problem (3.2) features two endogenously determined variables which are taken
as given by the original generation: their own human capital level h ∈ H and the
labor choice of the next generation ˜ l ∈ [0,1].
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summarized by the maximization problem (3.2):
• each household lives for one period and derives utility from its own consump-
tion, u(ct), and the consumption of its immediate successor, v(ct+1);
• each household lives for two periods but chooses the fraction of time devoted to
the production of consumption goods and the fraction of time devoted to the
accumulation of human capital of the subsequent generation in the ﬁrst period
only. Its consumption in the second period is chosen by the next generation,
and thus is only indirectly inﬂuenced by the level of human capital left to the
next generation.
3.2 The concept of Markov perfect equilibrium
The primary objective of this paper is to analyze closed-loop Markov perfect equi-
libria (MPE) of the economy speciﬁed above. To this end, we must now introduce
some new notation. Namely, by l ∈ L, where L = {l : (0,H] → [0,1],l ∈ C}8,
we will denote the Markov strategy of the next generation. Moreover, we shall let
0 ∈ L denote the constant zero function, and let 1 ∈ L denote a constant function
whose values are always equal to 1. We shall also introduce the correspondence
D : L × H → [0,1] deﬁned by
D(l
,h) = arg max
ˆ l∈[0,1]
u(f(h,ˆ l)) + v(f(˜ g(h,1 − ˆ l),l
(˜ g(h,1 − ˆ l)))). (3.3)
The best response of the current generation for next generation’s strategy l ∈ L is
therefore a selection l(·) from D(l|·).
We adopt the following deﬁnition of MPE:
Deﬁnition 1 A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the economy is a selection9
l∗ : (0, ¯ H] → [0,1] from D(l∗|·).
8By C we denote the set of all continuous functions with the given domain and codomain.
9We are leaving l∗(0) undeﬁned here, since under Assumptions 1 and 2, as we shall show later,
it is not single-valued. The economic justiﬁcation is the following: having no human capital one
produces, consumes and invests nothing, but since there is a no disutility of work, any level of l
could be optimal.
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The MPE can be interpreted either as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
an sequential intergenerational game or as a time-consistent policy which is equally
well suited for any generation. Since the time horizon of the economy is inﬁnite, we
concentrate on stationary Markov policies, i.e. such that in each period, the same
function of the state variable h is applied.10
3.3 Introducing stochastic transition
Unfortunately, as discussed by Leininger (1986) and others, the standard way of
obtaining results on the existence and uniqueness of MPE in similar setups – as ﬁxed
points of some self maps – is obstructed by the so-called “vicious circle” of strategy
space. The problem occurs when trying to construct appropriate sets of admissible
strategies/policies. Even very strong assumptions made on the strategy/policy of
the subsequent generation cannot guarantee that the best response to that strategy
would belong the the same strategy/policy space.
The crucial step required to solve this problem is to break the deterministic
links between subsequent generations (see Amir, 1996c; Nowak, 2003). In our case,
this would correspond to assuming that the transition (human capital accumulation
function) ˜ g be stochastic. Hence, we shall let G(·;h,1 − l) be the distribution of
human capital in the subsequent period, parametrized by the current human capital
level h and the time investment in education, 1 − l.
The introduction of stochastic factors in human capital accumulation is thus
motivated primarily by technical reasons. Such factors have sound economic mo-
tivation, though. Indeed, (i) heredity involves randomness: the unobservable skill
levels are not inherited from one’s parents deterministically; (ii) human capital is not
homogenous: it is technology-speciﬁc and thus up-front investment in it might (but
might not) be ineﬀective (Chari and Hopenhayn, 1991), depending on the future
pattern of technological progress; (iii) the motivation of children to learn is endoge-
nous (Orazem and Tesfatsion, 1997). All these factors taken together make it clear
10If the horizon of the economy were ﬁnite, we could solve for non-stationary policies by backward
induction.
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that treating investment in education as a lottery where future payoﬀs depend on
stochastic factors is quite reasonable.11
The following assumption on the stochastic transition follows Amir (1996c)
and Nowak (2006).
Assumption 2 (Technology) The distribution G satisﬁes the following condi-
tions:
• ∀h ∈ H, G(0|h,0) = 1,
• ∀h ∈ H,l ∈ [0,1),
G(·|h,1 − l) = (1 − g(h,1 − l))δ0(·) + g(h,1 − l)λ(·|h),
where
• g : H × [0,1] → [0,1] is strictly concave with respect to the second argument,
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, satisﬁes the condition: (∀l ∈ [0,1]),g(0,1 −
l) > 0,
• (∀l ∈ [0,1))g(·,1−l) and (∀h ∈ (0, ¯ H])g(h,·) are strictly increasing functions,
• (∀h ∈ H)liml→1 g
2(h,1 − l) = ∞ and (∀h ∈ H,l < 1),0 < g
2(h,1 − l) < ∞,
• λ(·|h) is a family of Borel transition probabilities on (0, ¯ H] that is stochastically
decreasing and continous with h,
• δ0 is a probability measure concentrated at zero.
The crucial implications of this speciﬁcation are as follows: with probability
1 − g(h,1 − l), the next generation’s human capital will be zero, indicating that
the investment in it has been completely ineﬀective. The economic interpretation
of this assumption can be twofold. First, it may capture human capital-dependent
11It should be noted that we rule out all systematic human capital externalities from non-relatives
here (Ben-Porath, 1967; Rangazas, 2000) and assume that children’s human capital is created from
parental human capital, education eﬀort, and stochastic factors only.
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mortality: the next generation’s zero human capital is then a synonym for not sur-
viving until adult age. Such a setup is in agreement with evidence: indeed, children
of better educated parents face a generally lower risk of dying young. Second, this
may also relate to the argument that skills are often technology-speciﬁc and that
technology might change fast enough to make all previously acquired skills obsolete.
With probability g(h,1 − l), i.e. conditional on survival and non-obsolescence of
skills, human capital is however drawn from a distribution λ which does not depend
l. This relates to the stochastic heredity assumption, coupled with the random
motivation of children to learn.
Assuming that the next generation follows a Markov strategy l ∈ L, the maxi-







(y)))G(dy;h,1 − ˆ l). (3.4)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the maximand of (3.4) (for a given h ∈ (0, ¯ H])
is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable with respect to ˆ l on (0,1). Furthermore, the
unique optimal labor supply level l∗ solves ζ(l∗,h,l) = 0 whenever interior, where












A MPE of the economy with stochastic transition is then a function l which solves
ζ(l(h),h,l) = 0 for all h ∈ (0, ¯ H].
3.4 Characteristics of the closed-loop MPE
Let us now comment on the possibilities of showing existence of a MPE in the given
class of functions. In the paper most closely related to this one, Balbus, Reﬀett,
and Wo´ zny (2008) have constructed an operator whose ﬁxed points are MPE of an
economy with intergenerational altruism (see also Bernheim and Ray (1987)). The
operator is deﬁned implicitly on the set of Lipschitz continuous functions belonging
to L by an appropriate ﬁrst order condition. The authors ﬁnd that it suﬃces to show
continuity of such an operator, and existence of a MPE follows by the Brouwer ﬁxed
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point theorem. In our particular case, however, their method fails due to the non-
uniqueness of the maximizer in equation (3.5) for h = 0. Speciﬁcally, for any l ∈ L
the optimal l∗(0) = [0,1]. Notice also that (∀h ∈ H,h > 0), l∗(h) = 1 is the best
response to l = 0. Hence, we cannot apply those results directly.
However before showing existence we may present some of equilibrium basic
properties. They will be helpful in our further analysis.
Theorem 1 (Characteristics of MPE) Suppose that a MPE exists.
Then:
• the set of Markov perfect equilibria of the economy has no ordered (in a point-
wise order) elements in L.
• If f
12(·,·) ≤ 0 and g
12(·,·) ≥ 0, then l∗ is strictly decreasing on (0, ¯ H) wherever
interior.
Proof of Theorem 1: Follows immediately from observing that our best response
operator is decreasing (in the partial pointwise order). See Balbus, Reﬀett, and
Wo´ zny (2008) for the details. The second statement of the theorem follows from
the observation that for the given assumptions, the objective function in (3.4) has
strictly increasing marginal returns. An application of the theorem due to Amir
(1996b) and Edlin and Shannon (1998) on strict comparative statics completes the
proof.
The ﬁrst assertion results from the fact that an appropriate operator deﬁned
derived from the ﬁrst order conditions, whose ﬁxed points are MPE of the economy,
is decreasing. The second assertion follows from established theorems on strict
monotone comparative statics (Amir (1996b); Edlin and Shannon (1998)) of optimal
solutions to maximization problems featuring a submodular function on a lattice.
Please observe that the reverse to the second assertion need not hold. Generally,
even if f
12(·,·) ≥ 0 and g
12(·,·) ≤ 0, the optimal labor supply policy l∗ need not
increase with h due to the strictly decreasing marginal utility.
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monotone comparative statics (Amir (1996b); Edlin and Shannon (1998)) of optimal
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Please observe that the reverse to the second assertion need not hold. Generally,
even if f
12(·,·) ≥ 0 and g
12(·,·) ≤ 0, the optimal labor supply policy l∗ need not
increase with h due to the strictly decreasing marginal utility.
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The methods used to show uniqueness of the MPE in the setup of Balbus, Reﬀett,
and Wo´ zny (2008) can be used in our current model as well, disregarding the fact
that in the current case, for any l ∈ L the optimal l∗(0) = [0,1]. To state this, we










The function ξh(0,1] → R+, with ξh(1) = 0, introduced just above, captures the
marginal utility of consumption coupled with marginal labor productivities in both
sectors. Obviously function ξ is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing, and
invertible with continuously diﬀerentiable inverse.
Let us also deﬁne an operator B on P = {¯ l : (0, ¯ H] → [0,∞)} such that for any






h (¯ l(y))))λ(dy|h). (3.7)
The operator B is going to be central to the reasoning in the remainder of the paper:
it will be used both in the proofs of our theoretical results and in their numerical
implementation. Its importance stems from the fact that by deﬁnition, the ﬁxed
point of B satisﬁes (3.6).12
The next theorem gives the conditions under which B has a unique ﬁxed point
in P. This ﬁnding is equivalent to showing under which conditions the MPE of the
considered economy, l∗ exists and is unique. By Ef
x we denote the partial elasticity






Theorem 2 (Existence and uniqueness) Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisﬁed.
Assume in addition that there exists an r ∈ (0,1) such that for all h ∈ H the
following holds:














Then there exists a unique MPE l∗ ∈ L of the economy under study.
12For a more detailed justiﬁcation, see Coleman (2000) and Balbus, Reﬀett, and Wo´ zny (2008).
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Proof of theorem 1: The result follows by applying theorem 5 (see Guo, Cho, and
Zhu (2004)). We ﬁrstly show that B maps a cone of measurable functions into itself
and is decreasing. Secondly we show that under condition 3.8 operator B satisﬁes
geometric condition in 5. For the details of a similar proof the reader is referred to
Balbus, Reﬀett, and Wo´ zny (2008).
Theorem 2 provides the suﬃcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a
ﬁxed point of a MPE of the considered economy. Moreover one can straightforwardly
compute it using a Picard iterative procedure.
The mathematical intuition behind Theorem 2 is the following: since the ﬁxed
point operator B is decreasing, it may have multiple, unordered ﬁxed points. The
condition in Theorem 2 asserts, however, that this operator is“convex”(see Guo and
Lakshmikantham (1988) for details) or – in other words – it is a“local contraction”.
This property is suﬃcient for existence of a unique ﬁxed point. Economically, the
condition (3.8) (“convexity” or “local contraction”) could be interpreted in terms
of partial elasticities: it requires that the product of elasticities of v,f and ξ
−1
h
cannot exceed unity, i.e. that the percentage change in next-period utility v resulting
from a one per-cent change in labor supply l cannot be “too high”. Otherwise, it
could be proﬁtable to deviate from the given policy – the loss in instantaneous
consumption sub-utility u would be more than compensated by the gain in next-
period consumption sub-utility v – indicating that the given policy could not be an
equilibrium any more.
We leave the questions on existence and number of equilibria when condition (3.8)
is not satisﬁed for further work. Instead, we shall now present our workhorse example
which will be used in our subsequent numerical exercises.




2 , f(h,l) = hα1lβ1. Furthermore, take any g
satisfying Assumption 2 with α1,β1,γ1,γ2 ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ (0,1]. If 1 > β1(γ1 + γ2)
then there exists a unique MPE in L.
Proof of Example 1: Observe that is this case elasticities of the utilities u and v
as well as f are constant. Hence we may apply the Guo, Cho, and Zhu (2004) theo-
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rem (see Theorem 5 in the Appendix) directly to the (decreasing) operator B which
can be calculated explicitly for the given functions.
4 Human capital dynamics with and without stra-
tegic interactions
In the current section, we shall compare the time-consistent Markov perfect policy
l∗, discussed in the previous section, to the outcomes obtained within a similar setup
which does not however allow for strategic interactions across generations.
To this end, we will focus on optimal (or full-commitment) policies. Speciﬁcally,
we will consider a setup where individuals live for two periods and decide over the
consumption (or labor supply) in the ﬁrst period taking the consumption function
of the next generation as given. In the other interpretation, individuals live for just
one period, but each subsequent generation fully commits to some level of l and
reveals it to the previous generation.
In order to attain comparability of utilities across diﬀerent periods, we assume
that v(·) = δu(·) where δ ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor. Finally, to ﬁnd the optimal
policy (generally time inconsistent) benchmark for our Markov perfect (time con-























Observe that the similar optimization problem can be obtained when we refor-
mulate the model such that individuals do not derive utility directly from their
successors’ consumption, but from their utility. Hence, generations’ choices can be
embedded in the ﬁrst generation’s optimization problem, ultimately yielding a“dy-
nastic”model with inﬁnite-horizon planning where each generation t > 0 maximizes
∞
τ=t δτ−tu(cτ).13
13Provided that the transversality condition holds: limτ→∞ Λτhτ = 0 (where Λ is the shadow
25Human capital dynamics with and without strategic interactions
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To see it formally (from t > 0), consider an economy populated by a sequence of
generations each represented by a single household with preferences U(ct,Vt+1) over
its consumption ct and its immediate descendants’ utility Vt+1. Since all generations’
utility functions are the same, their choices can be embedded in the ﬁrst generation’s
optimization problem. The solution to this maximization problem corresponds to a
stationary solution to an inﬁnite-horizon dynastic model with stochastic transition
in human capital levels: max{cτ}
∞
τ=t δτ−tu(cτ), where δ ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor.










where V (h) is the Bellman’s value function deﬁned as
V (h) = max
ˆ l∈[0,1]

u(f(h,ˆ l)) + δ

H
V (y)G(dy;h,1 − ˆ l)

. (4.10)
Standard arguments of dynamic programming (see e.g. Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott
(1989)) guarantee that under our assumptions the functional equation (4.10) has a
unique solution V and that the solution corresponds to a function l(h) which solves
V (h) = u(f(h,l(h))) + δ

H V (y)G(dy,h,1 − l(h)).
The ﬁrst order condition (4.9) guarantees that the marginal utility of consump-
tion of the current generation, acquired thanks to an extra unit of time devoted to
work, is exactly equal to the expected marginal cost in terms of utility lost by the
next generation because of having marginally less human capital. Having calculated
(for t > 0) the optimal policy l∗ : H → [0,1] in such a setup, one only needs to










V (y)G(dy,h0,1 − l0(h0))

.
Since the optimal setup rules out all strategic aspects of the decision process, the
full-commitment Markov policy for the dynastic optimization economy is (generally)
price of human capital). If the set of admissible human capital levels H is bounded, as it is in our
case, this transversality condition holds for sure.
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not a MPE of an economy with strategic interactions.14 It turns out, however, that
equilibrium policies for our basic model with strategic interactions and the optimal
policy abstracting from such interactions can be directly compared:
Theorem 3 (On comparing equilibria) Let lMPE be a MPE of an economy with
strategic interactions with v(·) = δu(·), and lR be the optimal stationary policy of a
dynastic economy with utility u. Then lMPE(h) > lR(h) for all h ∈ (0, ¯ H].
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider two families of functions parametrized by h ∈
(0, ¯ H], denoted as Sh,Zh : [0,1] → R+, such that for a given h ∈ (0, ¯ H],









where V is the value function corresponding to the Bellman equation (4.10).
We would like to show that for any given h, S
h(l) > Z
h(l) in their whole domain.






{u(f(h,l)) + δg(h,1 − l)

H
V (y)λ(dy|h)} = V (h). (4.11)







14A related class of models frequently encountered in the human capital accumulation literature
uses the framework of joy-of-giving altruism. In such models, generations do not derive their utility
directly from their successors’ consumption, but are instead interested in providing them with the
means allowing for consumption. In the context of human capital accumulation it means that their
utility function is u(ct)+v(ht+1). Hence, the decisions made by the next generation do not matter
for the utility of the current generation. Unfortunately, although widely used in the literature,
the “joy-of-giving” altruism utility function and hence the whole model is not directly comparable
to the ones studied in this paper. Hence, we only brieﬂy discuss the implications of joy-of-giving
altruism models in the context of our argument in Section 6.3.
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V (y)λ(dy|h) = Z

h(l), (4.13)
which completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Now let us impose another function T : {1,2} × [0,1] → R+ on top of that,
such that T(1,l) = Z(l) and T(2,l) = S(l). From inequality (4.13) we have that
T 
2(2,l) > T 
2(1,l), and thus T has increasing marginal returns with i = 1,2. For
i = 1,2, the function T(i,·) deﬁned on the lattice [0,1] is thus supermodular. Hence,
by the theorem due to Amir (1996b) and Edlin and Shannon (1998), we obtain that
(∀h ∈ (0,H])lMPE(h) = argmaxl∈[0,1] T(2,l) > argmaxl∈[0,1] T(1,l) = lR(h).
Theorem 3 asserts that equilibrium human capital investment is unambiguously
lower in an economy with strategic interactions than in an economy using the opti-
mal policy. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: the optimal invest-
ment policy under full commitment must exceed the equilibrium investment policy
when only partial commitment between consecutive generations is possible. Indeed,
under the optimal policy, the dynastic head from generation t will take into account
not only the consumption of the following generation t + 1, but of all generations
from t onwards. She will therefore be willing to save more for the future than a
generation t member of the strategic model: the latter person is myopic and wishes
to save for her children but not for her grandchildren.
Theorem 3 provides a formal argument determining the direction of the bias
incurred when a baseline model with strategic interactions is replaced with its non-
strategic counterpart.15
15Understandably, a similar clear-cut relationship does not exist between the strategic model and
the model with joy-of-giving altruism. Even though each numerical example has been prepared
so that direct comparisons could be possible, we ﬁnd that for diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations,
diﬀerent results are possible. Usually it is the strategic model which puts more weight on immediate
consumption and less on human capital accumulation; sometimes the result is reversed, though.
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not only the consumption of the following generation t + 1, but of all generations
from t onwards. She will therefore be willing to save more for the future than a
generation t member of the strategic model: the latter person is myopic and wishes
to save for her children but not for her grandchildren.
Theorem 3 provides a formal argument determining the direction of the bias
incurred when a baseline model with strategic interactions is replaced with its non-
strategic counterpart.15
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5 Computation of the MPE
The objective of the current section is to compute numerically the equilibrium policy
l∗ for an economy with strategic interactions and to analyze the equilibrium dynam-
ics of human capital accumulation given certain functional assumptions on u,v,f
and G. To facilitate economic interpretation, we will concentrate on iso-elastic util-
ity and Cobb-Douglas production functions here. We will then benchmark these
numerical results against the corresponding one obtained within the non-strategic
(dynastic) model discussed in the previous section.
Example 2 Extending Example 1, let us additionally assume that g(h,1 − l) =
1







(1 − l)β2−1. (5.14)
Furthermore, we assume that β2 = β1γ1.
The last equality assumption has been made for the sole purpose of analytical
tractability: it is only when β2 = β1γ1 that the ξh mapping is analytically invertible.
Relaxing it increases the computational burden signiﬁcantly but does not overturn
any of our results. If β2 = β1γ1, we obtain:
ξ
−1
















Assuming furthermore that the distribution λ is uniform on H, the MPE policy
can be found as l∗(y) = ξ
−1


























As stated in Theorem 2, repeated iteration of B guarantees convergence to the MPE
(see Figure 1).16
16To calculate the equilibrium policies of any of the three models numerically, we have used the
discretization method discussed by Judd (1998). Matlab codes used to compute the numerical
results quoted throughout the paper as well as to produce Table 1 are available from the authors
upon request.
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Theorem 4 The MPE policy l∗ is monotone. It is everywhere decreasing iﬀ α1γ1 <
α2, everywhere increasing iﬀ α1γ1 > α2, and constant iﬀ α1γ1 = α2.
Proof of Theorem 4: In equilibrium, ¯ l(h) = ξh(l(h)) can by deﬁned as the right-
hand side of (5.16).
We will now diﬀerentiate l(h) = ξ
−1
h (¯ l(h)) with respect to h. Observe that it is
justiﬁed since ξ
−1
h is diﬀerentiable while from equations (5.15) and (5.16) we also
have that functions ηz (where, for given z ∈ [0,∞), ηz(h) := ξ
−1
h (z)) and ¯ l are






























































1−β2. Since β1γ1 = β2, and by assumption, 1 >
β1(γ1 + γ2), it follows that
β1γ2
1−β2 < 1 and thus the ratio of two integrals in the last
parenthesis is smaller than one, we ﬁnd the expression in the last parenthesis to
be positive. In conclusion,
dl(h)
dh > 0 and thus l(h) is increasing in its domain iﬀ
α1γ1 > α2,
dl(h)
dh < 0 and thus l(h) is decreasing in its domain iﬀ α1γ1 < α2, and l(h)
is constant iﬀ α1γ1 = α2.
Having speciﬁed the three cases in which the optimal labor supply policy is
increasing, decreasing, or constant in the human capital endowment, let us discuss
the empirical plausibility of each of the cases. The results are somewhat reassuring
here. Namely, the case where α2 > α1γ1, guaranteed to hold e.g. if α1 ≈ α2
(i.e. if the shares of human capital in production of the consumption good and of
human capital, respectively, are approximately equal), turns out to be signiﬁcantly
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Figure 1: Convergence to the ﬁxed point of operator B. The ﬁxed point is the
auxilliary policy function ¯ l(h) = ξh(l(h)). Assumed parameter values: α1 = .3;β1 =
.7;α2 = .3;γ1 = .6;γ2 = .5;β2 = β1γ1 = .42; ¯ H = 100;δ = .9.
more plausible empirically than any of the other cases.17 This case, implying that
labor supply decreases (and human capital accumulation increases) with the stock
of human capital, is thus going to be our benchmark case.
5.1 Dynamics
The dynamic properties of the economy are as follows. If all generations play the
MPE strategy, then in the limit as t → ∞, average human capital tends to ¯ h solving
17Becker and Tomes (1986), Lochner (2008), among numerous others, discuss the empirical
evidence that the educational eﬀort and children’s school attainments are unambiguously positively
related to the parental human capital level.
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the implicit equation:
¯ h = 2
1
α2−1 ¯ H(1 − l(¯ h))
β2
1−α2. (5.18)
This result has been conﬁrmed numerically.18
The distribution of human capital will also evolve over time as consecutive gen-
erations will invest diﬀerent fractions of time to work and education. By deﬁnition,
however, the distribution of human capital over H will have a constant density
1
¯ Hg(¯ h,1 − l(¯ h)) = 1
¯ Hα2+1¯ hα2(1 − l(¯ h))β2 and a probability mass 1 − g(¯ h,1 − l(¯ h)) =
1 − 1
¯ Hα2¯ hα2(1 − l(¯ h))β2 concentrated at zero.
5.2 Role of the transition distribution λ
The MPE policy l∗(h) depends on the underlying transition distribution λ but this
impact turns out to be rather modest. As a robustness check of our earlier numerical
results, we have substituted the uniform distribution λ with two alternatives:








¯ H − 4
¯ H2h, h ∈ (
¯ H
2 , ¯ H);
(5.19)
• a one-point distribution19 with all probability mass concentrated in ¯ H/2:
P(h = ¯ H/2) = 1.
As we have conﬁrmed numerically,20 the greatest labor supply is obtained when the
distribution is uniform, and the least labor is supplied when the probability mass
is concentrated at the mean human capital level. The policy for the triangular
distribution falls in between these two extreme cases (uniform and one-point). The
interpretation of this result is straightforward: the more risk remains that human
capital of the successive generation would be low despite substantial investment, the
18The results are available from the authors upon request.
19Note that even when λ is one-point, there remains a probability that the next generation’s
human capital will be zero. Hence, the assumptions and interpretations of the economy with
strategic interactions studied in Section 3 are still satisﬁed.
20These results are available from the authors upon request.
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less willing the decision maker would be to invest in human capital. Since individuals
are risk-averse in this model, additional risk lowers education eﬀort and increases
labor supply which guarantees a certain payoﬀ.
6 Numerical assessment of the role of strategic
interactions
Let us now compare the equilibrium dynamics obtained in the numerical example
presented above to the ones generated by the optimal-policy, dynastic model of
Section 3.
Example 3 Let u(c) = cγ, f(h,l) = hα3lβ3, g(h,1 − l) = 1
¯ Hα4hα4(1 − l)β4. Let
the decision maker born at t maximize u(ct) + δu(ct+1). From (4.9), we obtain the
ﬁrst order condition for the optimal policy function l(h). It is given as an implicit
solution to the equation:
l1−β3γ







H V (y)λ(dy|h) is a predetermined constant.
Using the implicit function theorem, it can again be easily shown that l(h) is
everywhere decreasing whenever α4 > α3γ and everywhere increasing whenever
α4 < α3γ. In the special case where α3γ = α4, (6.20) implies that l(h) is constant,
independent of h. This ﬁnding parallels Theorem 4 precisely: there are absolutely no
qualitative diﬀerences in the optimal policy behavior between the strategic and the
non-strategic model. Quantitative diﬀerences are substantial, though, as we shall
see shortly.
Moreover, just like in the strategic case, the ﬁrst order condition (6.20) can be
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What remains to be derived is the constant I =

H V (y)λ(dy|h). It can be found









α4 (1 − l∗(y))β4λ(dy|h)
, (6.22)
with l∗ deﬁned as in (6.21) and thus containing I. The approximate solution to this
equation can be easily computed numerically. Please note that knowing I, we can
also obtain an explicit formula for the value function:






















The direct computation of I would not have been possible if not for the introduction
of stochastic transition in human capital levels. Thanks to that step, the inﬁnite
series expansion of V (h) can be computed as a simple geometric series which has a
closed-form sum. It also enables us to use the law of iterated expectations to convert
an n-tuple integral into a product of n simple integrals.
We are now in the position to compare the equilibrium labor supply policy func-
tion derived from the model with strategic intergenerational interactions with the
alternative non-strategic scenario. To attain direct comparability of both setups, we
must assure γ = γ1 = γ2 – in the dynastic model, the shape parameters of utility
functions u and v must be equal. We shall also ﬁx our other parameters at equal
levels, α1 = α3,β1 = β3,α2 = α4,β2 = β4.
The results are apparent in Figure 2. Signiﬁcantly more labor is supplied (and
thus, less human capital is accumulated) in the case of the MPE policy in our
baseline model with strategic interactions than in the optimal policy model which
does not include such interactions.21 This directly conﬁrms Theorem 3, providing a
quantitative edge to that result.
21Because of its diﬀerent utility function, the outcomes of the “joy-of-giving” altruism model
cannot be unambiguously compared to the two alternatives discussed here. There exist certain
cases (though arguably unusual) in which joy-of-giving altruism could give rise to less human
capital accumulation (and more labor supply) than dynastic optimization, possibly even more
than the strategic intergenerational game.
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does not include such interactions.21 This directly conﬁrms Theorem 3, providing a
quantitative edge to that result.
21Because of its diﬀerent utility function, the outcomes of the “joy-of-giving” altruism model
cannot be unambiguously compared to the two alternatives discussed here. There exist certain
cases (though arguably unusual) in which joy-of-giving altruism could give rise to less human
capital accumulation (and more labor supply) than dynastic optimization, possibly even more
than the strategic intergenerational game.
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Figure 2: The diﬀerence between equilibrium policy functions l∗(h) in the time-
consistent policy and the optimal but time-inconsistent policy. Assumed parameter
values: α1 = .3;β1 = .7;α2 = .3;γ = .6;β2 = β1γ1 = .42; ¯ H = 100;δ = .9.
Furthermore, even though there is a marked diﬀerence in the levels of human
capital investment between the models, the shapes of the policy functions are re-
markably similar. With iso-elastic utility and Cobb-Douglas production functions,
and under our benchmark parametrization, labor supply functions l∗(h) always de-
crease with h, indicating that human capital and education eﬀort are positively
related, in line with empirical observations (e.g. Becker and Tomes (1986)).
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6.1 Equilibrium investment in human capital: an interpre-
tation
The uniform ordering of labor supply functions obtained from the models under
consideration (the policy curves such as the ones depicted in Figure 2 never intersect)
oﬀers an intuitive and convincing explanation. In simple words: the more directly
does child’s human capital enter parent’s utility function, the more willing will she
be to invest in it.
The rationale is that with strategic interactions, utility acquired from second
period consumption is conditional on the strategy chosen by the subsequent gener-
ation while with the optimal policy model it is certain. Bernheim and Ray (1987)
identify, however, another force at work here: since in the strategic model, each
generation views the investment made by their children, (1 − l), as pure waste, it
must invest more to obtain the same eﬀect. The latter force turns out to have a
relatively smaller impact on our results in the benchmark parametrization, but it
could become dominant if β’s are suﬃciently small.22
Under dynastic optimization, utility is derived from children’s utility which is a
function of their human capital. In such case, the parents know exactly what would
eventually be optimal for their children; because of that knowledge, they can antici-
pate their children’s choices and solve for the social planner’s ﬁrst best which involves
substantial human capital investment (once you care for your children’s utility, you
also care for your grandchildren’s, great-grandchildren’s, etc.). Perfect anticipation
across generations is not possible in our baseline model with intergenerational inter-
actions, though. In our model, utility is derived from children’s consumption which
is decided endogenously by them in a process of utility maximization which takes
into account also the grandchildren’s consumption, for which the original generation
does not care. This gives one more intermediate step of embeddedness: human capi-
tal → children’s utility → children’s consumption. In result, the interest in investing
22With joy-of-giving altruism, utility is derived from child’s human capital directly; consequently,
investment in human capital will be the highest in such case, unless β1 and β2 are very low,
indicating that current production as well as human capital accumulation react to changes in labor
supply with a very small elasticity.
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in children’s human capital is smaller under this scenario. The unambiguous order-
ing of the strategic and the dynastic model, proved formally in Theorem 3, leads to
the conclusion that strategic interactions across generations are an important source
of underinvestment in human capital as compared to the intergenerational ﬁrst best.
6.2 Sensitivity analysis
In order to obtain a rough approximation of the magnitude of diﬀerence between
equilibrium policies in the two considered models, we have carried out a numerical
sensitivity analysis exercise: we have manipulated the parameters of the models
under study and compared the resultant equilibrium policy functions l∗(h). For
each parameter conﬁguration, we calculated two measures of distance between the
functions. Since by Theorem 3, we know that lMPE > lO (where MPE stands for
the Markov perfect equilibrium of our baseline strategic model and O stands for
“optimal”, i.e. the model featuring dynastic optimization), our proposed distance
measures have been deﬁned as follows:
1. The area between lMPE and lo: D1 =

H(lMPE(h) − lO(h))dh > 0.
2. The minimum distance between lMPE and lO:
D2 = infh∈H |lMPE(h) − lO(h)| > 0.
One crucial ﬁnding which facilitates the subsequent analysis and justiﬁes the above
deﬁnitions is that the policy functions never intersect.
For simplicity of computations, we have maintained the assumption β2 = β1γ1;
for comparability of our results, we have also retained the condition γ1 = γ2. This
limits the scope of this sensitivity analysis exercise markedly, but our intention
was not to search through the whole parameter space anyway. Even under these
restrictions, we ﬁnd both important departures from the baseline parametrization
illustrated in Figure 2 and potentially large distances between the two policy func-
tions.
First of all, our numerical exercise conﬁrms that equilibrium policy functions l∗
from diﬀerent models indeed never intersect (D2 > 0). Furthermore, the numerical
37Numerical assessment of the role of strategic interactions
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β1 = 0.5 25.9257 0.1884
α1 = 0.6 24.2728 0.2336
α1 = α2 = 0.6 13.0828 0.0215
α2 = 0.6 13.2903 0.0043
β1 = 0.6;γ = 0.8 22.3790 0.1617
lMPE ≈ l0: low δ
α1 = α2 = 0.6;δ = 0.6 4.0759 0.0044
α1 = α2 = 0.6;δ = 0.3 0.4628 0.0004
δ = 0.6 7.7896 0.0296
β1 = 0.6.γ = 0.8;δ = 0.6 6.4581 0.0361
δ = 0.3 0.9392 0.0026
β1 = 0.6;γ = 0.8;δ = 0.3 0.5958 0.0027
Source: own computations.
results on the ordering of policy functions obtained from the strategic model and
from the optimal policy (lMPE > lO) are obviously consistent with implications of
Theorem 3. The distance between these two policy functions can vary considerably,
though: under some parametrizations (such as the baseline parametrization), it is
large, while under others, in particular those involving radically low δ’s, it may even
be close to zero.
The results of our sensitivity analysis exercise have been summarized in Table 1.
The baseline parametrization is: α1 = 0.3;β1 = 0.7;α2 = 0.3;γ = 0.6;β2 = β1γ1 =
0.42; ¯ H = 100;δ = 0.9, just like in the previous section. Unless indicated otherwise,
these parameter choices are maintained throughout the table.
38Numerical assessment of the role of strategic interactions
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6.3 A model of joy-of-giving altruism
Let us now proceed to one diﬀerent example of a model which could be compared
against our benchmark model with intergenerational interactions in human capital
accumulation: a model with joy-of-giving altruism.
A model with joy-of-giving altruism (and, to guarantee direct comparability, with






v(y)G(dy;h,1 − ˆ l). (6.24)
The crucial diﬀerence between this model and the main model of the current paper
consists in the fact that here, parents’ utility depends directly on their children’s
human capital and not on their consumption (v(ht+1) instead of v(ct+1)).
Concentrating on Markovian policies, the ﬁrst order condition for optimal labor










guaranteeing that the marginal utility of consumption acquired thanks to an extra
unit of time devoted to work is exactly equal to the expected marginal cost in terms
of lost human capital of the next generation.
Example 4 Let u(c) = cγ5, v(h) = (h)γ6, f(h,l) = hα5lβ5, g(h,1−l) = 1
¯ Hα6hα6(1−
l)β6. From (6.25), we obtain the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal policy l(h). It
is given as an implicit solution to the equation:
l1−β5γ5
(1 − l)1−β6 =
β5γ5
δβ6
(1 + γ6) ¯ H
α6−γ6h
α5γ5−α6. (6.26)
Using the implicit function theorem, it is straightforward to show that l(h) is
everywhere decreasing whenever α6 > α5γ5 and everywhere increasing whenever
α6 < α5γ5. In the special case where α5γ5 = α6, (6.26) implies that l(h) is con-
stant, independent of h. This ﬁnding is crucial here because it is an exact ana-
logue to Theorem 4 and an equivalent theorem which holds for the dynastic model:
whenever the MPE labor supply policy of the model with strategic interactions is de-
creasing/increasing, it is also decreasing/increasing in the model with“joy-of-giving”
altruism.
39Numerical assessment of the role of strategic interactions
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39 Just like in Example 2, the above equation (6.26) can be solved for l∗(h) explicitly





















For the highest available level of comparability, one has to impose γ6 = β1γ2
in order to equalize the elasticities of h in both utility functions. The functions
themselves remain diﬀerent, though.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of the current paper has been to accomplish the two principal tasks:
(i) to show how a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) policy function can be com-
puted in a model with fully-speciﬁed intergenerational interactions in human capital
accumulation, within an otherwise standard discrete-time framework; (ii) to com-
pare the outcomes of the strategic model with a benchmark model which neglects
intergenerational interactions. To this end, we have proven analytically that when
compared to a model with dynastic optimization, our strategic model predicts un-
ambiguously lower equilibrium investment in human capital accumulation. We have
also demonstrated how the novel constructive method of computing Markov perfect
equilibria, due to Balbus, Reﬀett, and Wo´ zny (2008), may be used in computational
practice.
We believe that ﬁnding a constructive algorithm for computing MPE policies in
models of intergenerational altruism is a signiﬁcant step forward in modeling strate-
gic linkages across generations. In this paper, we have shown that this novel tool,
developed by Balbus, Reﬀett, and Wo´ zny (2008), can be generalized to capture inter-
generational linkages in human capital accumulation. We have shown under which
conditions the MPE policy exists and is unique, we have proven its monotonicity,
and also presented a workhorse example for which most calculations could be done
analytically, and for which the numerical convergence of our iterative procedure to
the MPE is quick and easy.
40Conclusion
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We have also presented the conditions under which the MPE labor supply policy
is increasing or decreasing. These conditions are the same for the strategic and
non-strategic model.
What remains to be done is, ﬁrst and foremost, a generalization of the construc-
tive algorithm for computing MPE policies into higher dimensions. This is enforced
by the fact that most economic models featuring intergenerational altruism are set
up with multiple choice and state variables. Another issue which ought to be dealt
with is the general equilibrium decentralization for both strategic and dynastic op-
timization models. As emphasized in the introduction, the nature of the stochastic
transition underlying the analyzed class of models makes it inherently diﬃcult to ob-
tain a general equilibrium characterization of a decentralized economy. We feel that
these two steps are necessary in order to bring models with strategic interactions
in human capital accumulation to the level of sophistication which is now common
with models lacking such strategic interactions.
41Appendix: an auxiliary theorem
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Appendix: an auxiliary theorem
Deﬁnition 2 Let E be a real Banach space and P ⊆ E be a nonempty, closed,
convex set. Then:
• P is called a cone if it satisﬁes two conditions: (i) x ∈ P, > 0 ⇒ x ∈ P and
(ii) x ∈ P,−x ∈ P ⇒ x = θ, where θ is a zero element of P,
• suppose P is a cone in E and P ◦ = ∅, where P ◦ denotes the set of interior
points of P, we say that P is a solid cone,
• every cone P in E deﬁnes an order relation ≤ in E as follows:
x ≤ y if y − x ∈ P,
• a cone P is said to be normal if there exists a constant N > 0 such that:
(∀x,y ∈ P) θ ≤ x ≤ y ⇒ x ≤ Ny.
Theorem 5 (Guo, Cho, and Zhu (2004)) Let P be a normal solid cone in a
real Banach space with partial ordering ≤ and B : P → P be a decreasing operator
(i.e. if l1 < l2 ∈ P then Bl2 ≤ Bl1) satisfying:
(∃r,0 < r < 1)(∀l ∈ P ◦),(∀t,0 < t < 1) trB(tl) ≤ Bl, (0.28)




∗ → 0, (0.29)
where (∀n ≥ 1)ln = B(ln−1).
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